An apology from Yan Xuetong
By Yan Xuetong, translated by Sean Ding and Heather Saul
[Yan Xuetong is the Director of International Studies at Tsinghua University]
Since 1999, when Lee Teng-hui put forward the “two nations” theory, I began to predict a possible military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. When Chen Shui-bian took office in 2000, I predicted that such a conflict would take place at some point before 2008. However, following this year’s election of the Taiwanese regional leadership and the failed UN referendum, relations are more stable than ever and there seems to be even greater prospects for peace. Thus, I would like to apologize to my readers for my false predictions. Secondly, I would like to engage in a mutual discussion concerning who is maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.
Some people believe that the present peaceful relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland is because the KMT is in power and Ma Ying-jeou has accepted the “1992 consensus.” Yet since 1979 there has been no war in the Taiwan Strait. So, who has been upholding peaceful relations?
The foundations of peace in the Taiwan Strait
Peace in the Taiwan Strait began in 1979 when the PRC decided to adopt a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan; it did not begin when Ma Ying-jeou won the general election in 2008. Contrary to popular belief, the civil war between the KMT and the Communist Party did not end in 1949, but continued until the end of 1978 with both sides conducting military attacks on each other for nearly three decades.
Peace is the absence of large-scale military violence. On January 1, 1979 an official letter entitled, “The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress informs our Taiwan compatriots” declared: “The Chinese government has ordered that from today onwards, the bombardment of Kinmen and other islands will cease.” Indeed, since that day the Taiwan Strait has not witnessed any military clashes and has enjoyed 30 years of continuous peace.
The long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait is the direct result of the peaceful reunification policy adopted by the Mainland. After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, it never had the military strength to initiate a counterattack against the mainland. Likewise, the Korean War, which lasted from 1950-1953, showed that the U.S military could not overcome the People’s Liberation Army. The KMT was even less able to launch counterattacks on the mainland. Thus, the United States encouraged Taiwan to adopt a “two-China” policy or a “one China, one Taiwan” policy. In 1964, when China conducted nuclear tests (showing itself to be a nuclear power), the KMT government could only use the slogan “counterattack the mainland” as a piece of political propaganda, not as a realistic policy solution. In 1971, the PRC secured a legitimate seat in the United Nations, and in 1979 the United States normalized relations with the Mainland. This means that the desire by the US and Taiwan to initiate a attack disappeared and that as long as the mainland did not carry out military attacks against Taiwan, there was peace in the Taiwan Strait. This proves that the peaceful reunification policy that began in 1979 brought peace to the Taiwan Strait.
The underlying cause of long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait is based on the Mainland government’s principles concerning economic development. Since 1978 when the “reform and opening up” policy began, economic development has been the overriding mission of the Chinese government. Therefore, China’s policy priority has been to pursue relations as conducive to economic development. Reunification is just a political goal for the future. Beginning in the 1980’s, many Mainlanders believed that forceful reunification with Taiwan was not good for economic development on the Mainland. During the 1990’s, this understanding developed into the idea that military prevention of “Taiwan independence” was also not good for the Mainland’s economic development. In 1993, after Lee Teng-hui initiated the “Taiwan independence” policy, the “Taiwan Independence” forces blossomed. As these forces blossomed, the Mainland’s peaceful reunification policy was prevented from developing, leaving a more pressing issue: how to prevent “Taiwan independence.” As part of a military deterrence strategy against Taiwan independence, the Mainland practiced military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. However, this had no real effect on the Taiwan independence movement. Although many are suspicious that conducting military strikes could prevent “de jure independence,” the basic fact remains that as economic construction is the principle of the Mainland government, Beijing has never initiated military strikes in response to “Taiwan independence.”
New cross-Strait stability
The advent of 2008 has signified a new stable period of the Taiwan Strait. The Strait experienced both turbulence and stability in the past three decades: from 1979 to 1992, stability was achieved because the ruling parties on both sides opposed Taiwan independence, yet neither expected an immediate reunification. The 14 years between 1993 and 2007 was an unstable period, in which Taipei enthusiastically promoted independence, while the mainland could not tolerate such a policy. From 2008 onward, the Strait situation has again returned to stability, with no immediate danger of military conflict.
The current stability of the Taiwan Strait is based on two factors. First, Taipei’s authorities no longer use the “Taiwan independence” rhetoric in pursuit of national sovereignty, and second, the mainland would not react to a “Taiwan independence” challenge with force. As president Hu Jintao said on March 4, 2008 in his Taiwan policy speech, “We are always committed to our pledges to the Taiwan compatriots. We will never sway upon temporary fluctuations of the situation, or change upon a few individuals' deliberate disturbances”.
The presumption of the current stability of the Strait is that the two sides have agreed to shelve their controversies over the 1992 Consensus. Indeed, Beijing differs drastically from Taipei in terms of its interpretation of the 1992 Consensus. While the mainland insists that the essence of the Consensus is “one China”, Ma Ying-jeou’s administration believes that the two sides should agree to differ on the definition of such a concept. Ma suggests that while Taiwan and the mainland share a common Chinese culture, the two sides of the Strait should be two sovereign states. For instance, as recorded in the English edition of his inaugural address, Ma translates his original Chinese statement which suggests “both sides of the Strait belong to the same Chinese nation” into “In light of our common Chinese heritage”, reducing the externality of the “one China” concept to its minimum; also, after his electoral victory Ma introduced the policy of “mutual non-denial” for relations, indicating his unwillingness of being constrained by Beijing’s “one China” concept. In addition, Ma used both “Taiwan” and “Republic of China” as subjective in his inaugural speech, implying that “Republic of China” equals Taiwan. At the end of his speech, Ma even clearly defined Taiwan’s territory as including Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.
Due to the two sides’ conflicting interpretations of the 1992 Consensus, shelving such disagreements has become an underlying presumption for peace. During the meetings between President Hu Jintao and the newly elected Taiwanese vice president Hsiao Wan-chang on April 7, 2008, Hsiao expressed his objections against the phrase “one China principle” printed on the official media report of his meetings with Hu. After this incident, Beijing’s official statements on Taiwan replaced the “one China principle” phrase with “1992 Consensus”. Such change represents the principle of “shelving controversies” in Beijing’s Taiwan policy, and indicates that mutual recognition of the 1992 Consensus is not sufficient for stability without shelving controversies over the Consensus.
Shelving controversies over the 1992 Consensus means that the both sides need to bring their disputes over sovereignty to an end. Since 1993 when Taiwan initiated its independence project, the nature of relations has transformed from power struggle to sovereignty dispute. As Ma Ying-jeou says in his inaugural address, “in resolving issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life”. Ma also states that “Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can relations move forward with confidence”. Clearly, the presumption of relations pictured by Ma Ying-jeou resembles the separation of sovereignty between North and South Korea.
The future trend of peace
No military conflict will break out in the Taiwan Strait before 2016 if as long as both sides do not deny each other’s sovereignty. It is highly likely that Ma Ying-jeou will serve two terms. Beijing will not penalize Taiwan by military force for its attempts of expanding “international space”, as long as Ma keeps his commitment in “conducting dialogues based on the 1992 Consensus”. Under these circumstances, peace will be warranted. Ma Ying-jeou has proposed Taiwan’s participation in international organizations under the name “Chinese Taipei”: currently, Taiwan will participate in the Olympic Games as “Chinese Taipei”, and in the WTO as TPKM (Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu). Hence, it is possible that Taiwan will join most of the international organizations under the name “Chinese Taipei” in or before 2016. If this is the case, relations in 2016 will be significantly more amicable than the relations between the two Koreas, because there is no nuclear issue between the two sides.
If the two sides can reach a peace agreement, it is likely that the two sides will establish a mechanism for military exchange. President Hu Jintao states in his March 4th speech that “the negotiation will be conducted on an equal footing with completely open topics -- there is nothing we can't talk about. We should seek to address important issues such as politics, economy, military, culture and foreign relations through negotiations, and plan for the future development of relations”. Ma Ying-jeou responded to Hu’s proposal in his May 20th inaugural address by calling upon the two sides to “pursue reconciliation and truce in both and international arenas”. Ma also suggests: “We should help and respect each other in international organizations and activities”. If the two sides construct a mutual assistance relationship in international organizations, there will be no obstacles for military exchange. Once the two sides conduct military exchange, the prospect of peace will be much more optimistic than peace on the Korean peninsula, where a military exchange mechanism is absent.
If the two sides maintain political dialogue, the development of the U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will not trigger tension in the Strait. The military foundations of Taiwan independence rely on America’s military protection. Since a strengthened U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will inevitably encourage the pro-independence forces on the Island, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have always been a destabilizing factor. relations should remain peaceful, and Beijing will not deter Taipei for its arms deals with Washington, if the two sides take advantage of the current harmony and establish a military exchange mechanism that is capable of neutralizing the negative effects caused by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. For instance, the U.S. government informed China on March 25th that it mistakenly shipped four fuses for nuclear missiles to Taiwan in 2006. Although Beijing demanded Washington to conduct a thorough investigation, such an incident did not impact the development of relations. The fact that Ma Ying-jeou’s government will inevitably purchase arms from the U.S. will become a serious trouble for China; however, Beijing’s policymakers do not necessarily have to pressure their counterparts across the Strait in order to resolve the problem.
The stable trend of peace beginning from 2008 will undoubtedly promote peace and development in the Taiwan Strait, although no one can foresee if such a trend will effectively prevent Taiwan independence and further reunification. During the past 30 years, the Taiwan Strait has remained peaceful; reunification has yet to be achieved; and Taiwan independence forces have been strengthened. I hope that my forecasts on relations in the coming 8 years will not be proven wrong, as were the false predictions about a military conflict in the Strait that I previously made.
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