edit to the last post

I realize that #5 and #9 (along with a long list of other things) are really just two parts of what could be called the "harmonization" of Beijing for the Olympics. No dirty restaurants, no spitting, and no unwanted people. As a Chinese article on the China Elections website says, "2008年的北京并不是真正的北京，而是为了开一个“平安与和谐”的奥运而被重新梳妆和打扮出来的有点扭扭捏捏、装腔作势的北京."

Basically: "The 2008 Beijing, is not the real Beijing, but instead is a Beijing that, in order to put on a 'safe and harmonious' Olympics, is being newly dressed up and putting on airs."

I'll be happy to return when Beijing is back to normal.

能否归回家？ Going home

So as most of you probably know, I'm heading back to the US in August. Yes, I know this means I'm missing the Olympics, but tickets for events are either impossible to get, too expensive, or for events I don't want to see anyway. That and thanks to Olympic security regulations, I need to process my next visa in the US. So to comfort myself for missing the Olympics (which I have always wanted to see live...really, I asked my parents if we could go to Atlanta in 1996), I made a top 10 list (in no particular order) of why I'm glad to be going back:

1. pollution

My biggest complaint, hands down, about Beijing is the air quality. Click the link to see what i'm talking about, though it has gotten much, much better this summer, thanks to temporary measures such as shutting down factories and curbing traffic.

2. subway security checks

They are checking bags at every subway stop (kind of....they sometimes force you to go through the back check, sometimes they don't), but it is causing nightmares (I had a blogpost with a picture of a crazy long line outside one of the stops but he took the picture down...sorry). It will only get worse when the Games actually come.

3. crowds

With 1.3 billion people (all of whom, I swear, live in Beijing), there are always crowds in China, but thanks to the restrictions that limit private cars, more people are taking public transportation. Thankfully this doesn't seem to have greatly affected my daily bus route. But still, the crowds are there.

4. 老外 foreigners

The city will be filled with foreigners who don't speak Chinese. No offense if you're one of them, but I'll be glad to miss the chaos.

5. no street food or cheap, dirty restaurants

Why can't the lady who sells fruit near the office sell me my mangoes in peace? I understand that most foreigners are used to higher levels of sanitary conditions, but I like the cheap food!

6. American television coverage of the Olympics

So the one channel on TV that I watch with any regularity is the sports channel and lets just say they play a lot of Olympic re-runs. Obviously CCTV is not an unbiased organization and all sports channels cheer for their own country, but you could at least give the other team credit (a 好球 here and there when deserved) for their achievements. This does seem to be improving – I watched an international volleyball tournament live recently and the announcers did say “nice shot,” etc for the other team.

7. shopping in peace

Please just let me look at what you have in your store/stall and decide what I want to buy. You bothering me is only going to make me less likely to buy from you.

8. bbq

Ever since the 4^th of July I've been craving bbq. I can't wait!

9. kicking out of migrant workers

Sure, migrant workers are more likely to stare at me, but they're also the ones that built all the Olympic facilities, and from a pure human rights perspective, they should be allowed to stay in Beijing.

10. China's inevitable 小题大做

People have all sorts of theories about what will go down come August 8. Mine is that small groups or individuals will, probably more than once, try to engage in public protest, and I'm pretty sure Beijing will overreact. I really hope such overreaction doesn't happen, but I'm not optimistic.

And obviously it will be great to see everyone. I realized that in the course of a little over a month, I will be in every city that I think of as “home;” this also includes every place, excluding one, where I've lived at least 3 months of my life. (LA, Pennsylvania, bay area...i will also probably be going to Boston and NYC for a day or two...let me know if you'll be in these places!)

PS. I have a few things I've wanted to post...both other people's articles and my own. I will do that ASAP.

Behind the reluctance of China and Africa to criticize Mugabe

So in celebration of the 4th of July, I'm posting what some would consider an "unpatriotic" article about the dubious morality of American involvement in Africa by Howard French, a NYtimes columnist who spent a lot of time there. Though I'm still craving bbq. also here.

By Howard French

SHANGHAI: For a crisis involving African despotism, the decibel readings in the West over Zimbabwe have reached almost unprecedented levels.

Beyond the din of condemnations of Robert Mugabe, that country's aging, power-obsessed tyrant, however, a great many questions have gone unexamined.

Western governments led by London and Washington look at Mugabe's rule and see such a clear-cut case of evil that they are at a loss to understand why the rest of Africa - or China, for that matter, a Security Council member with fast-deepening ties with the continent - doesn't rush to join in on their condemnation.

The Zimbabwe case should be more, though, than a tragedy for its own people, for it presents an invaluable opportunity to think about how differently the world can look from different vantage points. And far from an idle thought exercise, this might helpfully lead to a rethinking of diplomatic strategy in Africa and in other parts of the world.

As the second most important country in southern Africa, Zimbabwe, like that region itself, has long functioned like a kaleidoscope, serving up dramatically different perspectives to different viewers.

I was reminded of this fact by the recent news that a South African citizen of Chinese ancestry, Patrick Chong, had won a lawsuit enabling him to be legally considered black. The outcome was a triumph over a history of double discrimination. Like other ethnic Chinese, the plaintiff, who is chairman of the Chinese Association of South Africa, was denied many basic rights during the apartheid era, and he had also been denied the compensation won by the country's black majority with the demise of a system of legally enshrined racism.

As the perverse language of apartheid would have put it, Chong has now become an "honorary black."

What does this all have to do with Zimbabwe? Before Zimbabwe became a majority-ruled, independent country in 1980, and during the long years of apartheid in South Africa, both of those countries were treated with similar perversity as honorary members of the West.

While China was building the Tazara Railroad, to connect Zambia's mines to Tanzania's ports in order to loosen white-ruled South Africa's economic grip on the southern half of the continent, the United States and Britain were running diplomatic interference for apartheid rule in Pretoria.

Washington often went further, backing South African guerrilla proxies in places like Angola, prolonging devastating wars there and elsewhere, and staving off independence for South African-occupied Namibia in the name of fighting communism.

Short memories abound, but in Africa this is not yet ancient history. In 1987, while South Africa was actively pursuing a policy of sabotage against its neighbors, devastating vital infrastructure and supporting mass killers like the Renamo rebels in Mozambique, Washington reserved most of its indignation for "necklacing," a small-bore terror tactic practiced by blacks in South Africa. An amendment passed with overwhelming support in the U.S. Senate requiring southern African countries to condemn these lynchings or lose American aid.

Mugabe said it himself when he wrote in Foreign Affairs in 1987: "Political and material support of desperate bandit groups, dissidents and self-seeking, discredited individuals by a superpower like the United States is a prescription for chaos and instability in the international political system. Calling such a hodgepodge of individuals 'freedom fighters' does not make them any such thing."

Looking back, it isn't hard to conclude that China was in many ways closer to being on the right side of history in southern Africa than the United States, for all of America's vaunted attachment to freedom, democracy and human rights.

It is anything but clear that China has maintained that position today, as it pursues neo-mercantilist policies and abstains from pressuring Mugabe to end the campaign of terror and economic devastation waged against his own people.

Still, if one pauses to consider, it is relatively easy to grasp why African leaders might question the good faith behind the West's admirable sounding values and abstain from the chorus of condemnations, or why the Chinese might themselves be skeptical.

An African journalist wrote me this week, comparing the vociferous Western response to Mugabe to the customary silence that attends atrocities, political hijackings and despotism on the continent, especially where critical Western interests are in play. A former U.S. ambassador to Zimbabwe had told her: "Everyone felt they had invested something in the success of Zimbabwe, so when it all began unraveling, everyone felt personally disappointed and let down."

This looks too easy by half, and it is hard to avoid the heretical question whether the vociferous response, especially by Britain, isn't somehow related to race?

Unlike most of the continent, Rhodesia, like South Africa and Kenya, were places where whites settled and became attached.

Ivory Coast, another erstwhile showcase, was allowed to cycle through stolen elections, coups, ethnic cleansing and civil war, registering scarcely a ripple on the global agenda.

But telling Africans they will be judged by how they line up on Zimbabwe is counterproductive for other reasons, too. The West's constant search for African leaders to anoint or vilify is resented on the continent, and its track record, moreover, is riddled with spots.

Paranoid African dictators look at the calls to denounce Mugabe and worry they might be next. The more democratically inclined know better. They see Washington's embrace of dictators in places like Equatorial Guinea, or even former enemies, like the robber baron former Marxists who run Angola, and see a pattern of highly selective outrage. Might the fact that these countries - to name but two - are swimming in oil have something to do with escaping the Mugabe treatment?

China looks at this inconsistency, too, and naturally suspects it is being discriminated against. The only African country that has drawn more Western critical fire than Zimbabwe recently is Sudan, for its genocidal campaign in Darfur. It's an emerging oil power, too, but unlike so many African kleptocracies, its product flows east, not west.

Press freedom contradictions and the trend towards transparency

Writing this article and reading about the recent Weng'an incident (also here) have given me a very mixed impression about the future of press freedom in China. Though this article is more positive. also here.

By Jennifer Haskell

While globalization's effects on the international media are certainly not new, 2008 has so far seen a dramatic increase in interaction between the Chinese and Western media. The Chinese are paying closer attention to the Western press than ever before and realizing that lack of government control does not mean it is always fair and balanced. And the West has also begun to read and comment on the Chinese press, though usually sticking to the official media, which only reinforces long-held assumptions about the state of journalism in China. The controversy following the Lhasa riots and the international leg of the torch relay highlights both trends.

In reality, the media situation in China is much more complicated, and some of these nuances became clear to the West following the Sichuan earthquake. In the beginning, Western press had nothing but praise for the openness and transparency with which China administered relief efforts. The government first tried to administer its usual controls on access to disaster sites, but when many local news outlets ignored the ban, a more open approach was embraced, as Chinese and foreign journalists were permitted to report directly from the scene, interviewing victims and disseminating information about the quake. Later in May, however, the central government once again tried to tighten its grip on the press, which the Western media reacted to with regret, cynicism, and criticism.

To the Chinese press, such fluctuations in openness are nothing new, as the role of the media is in a constant and complicated state of flux, subject to restriction at any time. Still, compared to ten years ago, the trend is clearly toward openness and developing "supervision by public opinion" (yulun jiandu), which is often used to refer to investigative journalism or the watchdog role of the media, and such hard-hitting reporting is more prominent than most in the West realize. Liu Yu, a CCTV employee, recently outlined three stages in the development of the media's role as a watchdog in Media magazine. His first stage – from 2001 to 2002 – saw the prominence of investigative television shows such as "Interview Focus" and "Investigative News." The second stage, from 2003 to August 2004, included the promotion of all aspects of investigative journalism, forming a "small high tide". During this period Southern Metropolis Daily broke the story of Sun Zhigang, a migrant worker who was detained and beaten to death for not carrying his Guangzhou residency permit. His case led to the revoking of the law under which Sun was held. This period also saw the outbreak of SARS as well as other cases of journalism bringing scandals to light.

The third stage, beginning in August 2004, saw a rise in editorials as an important source of social commentary and media challenging the status quo. Chang Ping's editorial earlier this year calling for less restrictions on the media did just that and ignited a firestorm of criticism online. While 2006 saw tighter restrictions on investigative reporting that focuses on corrupt officials, Caijing continued to publish such reports on economic issues and mining accidents became a big focus of journalistic investigation.

Despite restrictions that are both self and government imposed, media that pushes the envelope and challenges the status quo continues to thrive, with Caijing and the Southern Media Group (which publishes the Southern Metropolis Daily and Southern Weekend as well as other publications) at the forefront. Caijing recently published an extensive investigative piece on the quality of school construction in Sichuan, despite official orders to drop the issue. Southern Media Group publications, in addition to being the home of controversial editor Chang Ping, broke the story earlier this year of the fraud of Nanjie village and has provided consistently good coverage of the earthquake. Both publications have strategies for evading government control and punishment, as described in a recent NPR report on journalism in China. Caijing often employs scientific or legal jargon to mask its hard-hitting reports, and its international reputation also helps protect it against government interference. The Southern Metropolis Daily has had a more tumultuous history, angering local officials with its story on Sun Zhigang, which led to the jailing of its editor, and has since learned to do its investigative reporting in other provinces. Still, the paper often has to preemptively fire its own editors to avoid trouble.

Chinese leadership is not quite certain how to deal with the changing nature of the domestic and international media environment. Lessons have been learned from the handling of the controversy following the Lhasa riots as well as the aftermath of the earthquake, but it is not clear that this will necessarily lead to more openness. In a speech marking the 60th anniversary of the People's Daily, Hu Jintao acknowledged the need for the Party's media to adapt to the times and effectively use new methods to propagate its message and compete with both the much more popular commercial media and the international media. He notes the media's success after the earthquake in inspiring the people's confidence and winning praise both domestically and internationally, but credits this success with the timeliness and thoroughness of reporting, not mentioning openness or transparency. Additionally, Hu only refers to "supervision of public opinion" once, among a long list of things that need to be done in the new media environment. Instead, he emphasizes the Party's media's role in the "guidance of public opinion" (yulun yindao), which he mentions 9 times. The rhetoric of President Hu's speech definitely indicates a recognition of the need to change but no suggestion that such change will lead to more media freedom and less control. (China Media Project has an in depth analysis of the speech).

Still, there is only so much the CCP can do to control the flow of information or public opinion. A large part of the change in the global media environment comes from the Internet, where Chinese citizens can easily access Western media like the New York Times or CNN; even if the site is blocked, proxy servers are commonplace. And that's exactly what Chinese netizens did following the Lhasa riots – went to Western sources for information as domestic media did not originally report on the incident, and the controversy that followed forced the Chinese press to at least address the issue. Posts on BBS forums and blogs also often precede reporting in the traditional press. The recent Weng'an riots are a perfect example of how online commentary and Western reporting on the incident forced Xinhua to give a much more detailed report than its original four sentence press release. Furthermore, online, anything and everything is talked about and all opinions are aired, even if having an unpopular viewpoint leads to harsh criticism by the majority. Even if controversial posts are often taken down, the discussion is still occurring, and online media are playing an increasingly important role in China, for better or for worse (for worse being the vociferousness of fervent nationalists). Hu certainly understands these trends; while at the People's Daily, he briefly chatted with netizens, discussing his own online habits. Yet, it remains to be seen how much free rein the CCP will continue to give both traditional and new media outlets.

In his speech, Hu also notes that the prevailing attitude on culture and media remains that the "West is strong, China is weak." An editorial in Southern Weekend by Xiao Shu agrees that the Chinese media needs to mature in order to both change this attitude and increase China's soft power. He argues that the reporting on the earthquake demonstrated that the Chinese press has the capability of rising to the occasion but in order to develop needs more freedom in which to operate as well as more market competition. Chang Ping had made a similar argument – that in order to avoid inaccurate reports and counteract bias, China needs a free and open reporting environment; only then can the truth come out.

However, Chinese leaders do see a role for "supervision by public opinion," specifically in fighting corruption. In addition to setting up a hotline for monitoring government officials, the CCP Central Committee's five year anti-corruption plan also calls on the media to play a larger role in supervising party members. A Beijing Youth Daily article called on officials to accept scrutiny and oversight by the press, as it can help them perform their jobs better; it also instructed the media to operate in a scientific, legal, and constructive manner. Liu Yu also calls on the press to be responsible in its investigations. Several media outlets are calling for an open account of what happened in Weng'an, where citizens believe the government is covering up a rape and murder; they are doing their job of "supervision by public opinion," and acting as a watchdog, but will the government respond positively? This remains to be seen.

Still, even if they have to deal with capricious crackdowns, both online and traditional media continue to push the boundaries of what is acceptable. When one goes beyond the media directly controlled by the CCP, it becomes obvious that while development and growth is needed and while there are clear boundaries, the press is beginning to step into its role of "supervision by public opinion," investigating, bringing scandals to light, and even questioning the government. It may not be occurring as rapidly as many in the West would like, but the trend is most definitely towards openness and freedom of the press.

看世界 Seeing the world

New York Times foreign correspondent in Shanghai, Howard French, wrote a "going away" (or "going home") article in the International Herald Tribune, as he is returning to the US after 3 decades of reporting from abroad. The last paragraph really struck me:

"Three decades ago, I set out on a journey desiring the world, and though one is humbled to know how much there is to be seen, and how little any one person can understand, there is little room for disappointment."

I also have a desire to see and, more importantly, understand the world. While my chosen career path means that I probably will not see as many places as French has, I will always be tempted to set off one day to wonder around the world. But more importantly, I desire that understanding of how people from vastly different backgrounds think about and view important issues and the world around them.

Re-organization

I'm in the mood for re-organizing, maybe because I've been re-organizing my life a bit recently. I just moved all of my things across town and am officially living with Zi. My visa situation seems to be working itself out, as I should have one until the end of July and then another visa beginning in September (yes that does mean I will be spending August back in the states). I'm working full time at BCPR until the end of July and then beginning in the fall, I will be working there as well as teaching at a new university.

Recently, a lot of what I've written on here has been politics and/or China related, and really that's what I enjoy writing about. I will continue to throw in personal stories and/or anecdotes whenever I feel like it. Because I have both articles and translations that have gone up on the NGO's website, I will also post those on here (both ones that are already up and ones that I write in the future). I also plan to post really, really good/interesting/relevant things that are written on the same topics either by my colleagues or by others (if you're looking for things to read online that are just good or really good, get google reader and add me as a friend. I share lots of news articles on there. Or ask me for blog recommendations). I've already added a bunch of posts in chronological order (meaning that the earliest ones are father down on the page...or see the list on the side).

To deal with all of this craziness, I now have labels for the types of posts (on blogspot), and they should be self-explanatory. As of right now, I'm not sure how much of this I will be cross-posting on facebook, and blogspot seems to be on the good side of the great-almighty censor (knock on wood). As always, I welcome any and all comments~

In defense of Ding Gang

One of my colleagues in the US (really) takes on a Washington Post commentator. It's a very harsh critique, though much of it is deserved. also here.

What is wrong with Edward Cody's article?

By Joseph Miller

Directly following the international community’s coverage of the Tibetan protests and the skirmishes following the Olympic torch, a bellicose and unexpected surge of protest arose from the Chinese people. On the web and on the pavement, citizens of the People’s Republic of China and overseas Chinese decried the western media for being biased and distorted. The most commonly entertained explanation for this fierce outpouring was twofold: a warped vision of the West and Tibet by Chinese government propaganda and a rising irrational nationalist feeling. But after reading the Washington Post’s, “In China, Fascination With Obama's Skin Color”, an analysis by Edward Cody of a Chinese article on the U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama, I think its time we considered that the Chinese might be right about the Western Media, or at least Mr. Cody.

The Chinese article in question is called “The Obama Phenomenon” by Ding Gang (to read the English version, click here; to read the Chinese version, click here), and was printed after Obama’s victory over Hillary Clinton to become the Democratic nominee. As for The Post’s bias, it is so pervasive in the article that one is at a loss over where to begin, as if surveying a totaled car of an article. But why not start with the title, “In China, Fascination with Obama's Skin Color”. Fascination? Ding Gang refers to Obama’s skin color in a purely academic manner, analyzing its likely affect on Americans. If one has read a multitude of Chinese articles on Barack Obama (this article only cites one) and consistently found that skin color was mentioned out of context of a larger American societal debate, one might begin to claim China was indeed fascinated by Obama’s skin. Mr. Cody seems to think it is ample to make this claim for 1.3 billion people based on the first sentence of Ding Gang’s article, which (according to Mr. Cody’s article) states that Obama’s skin color was the biggest focal point of the primary. Never mind the fact that this is an awfully strong translation of Ding Gang’s opening sentence, which can be read as saying, “Obama’s skin color has been one of the most observed aspects of this year’s American presidential race.”. The very next paragraph talks about Obama’s promise of change. “The Obama Phenomenon” extols how this presidential candidate is hugely talented and a representation of the American dream. Fascinated with skin color? It certainly doesn’t appear that way; multiple reasons are given for Obama’s appeal.

This is not to say that Ding Gang’s article doesn’t have a bias of its own. It is an extremely critical and cynical article, with what is very blunt and racially driven rhetoric. Chinese society may indeed have a rather blunt approach to the discussion of race, but the accusation that the U.S. is a nation in the Anglo-Saxon Protestant mold is an oversimplification to say the least. America is a multicultural and religiously pluralistic society; Anglo-Saxons make up only a small section of the white population (there are large Asian, Hispanic, as well as African American minorities) and Catholics outnumber any single Protestant denomination. In terms of Ding Gang’s analysis of Obama’s promise of change, he seems to be making the case that elections in the U.S. do not have a large influence. He states that Obama may represent change, but actually is in line with mainstream U.S. values and can do very little when he enters office. In addition, he compares the election between John McCain and Barack Obama as changing actors on a stage, reinforcing the idea that U.S. elections are a sham. Of course, because Ding Gang is a writer for the People’s Daily (a government supported newspaper) it might be in his interests to state that elections fail to change the government’s situation. To be as cynical as Ding Gang is a bit ridiculous. Hardly a mere actor, the U.S. president is a legislative, executive, and symbolic force. Barack Obama, with a Democratic Party-controlled Congress in tow, could make many real changes to U.S. military, economic, and trade policies. As a head of state, he could be a powerful, transformative symbol of a multicultural society. If he manages to have a successful presidency, he might forever dispel the notions of racial inferiority. This being said, Edward Cody’s critique of Ding Gang is simply flawed.

Perhaps one of the most mirthfully ridiculous claims Cody makes is in his first paragraph. He states: “America may be discussing whether Barack Obama is tough enough to field a 3 a.m. phone call, but for the Chinese Communist Party's official newspaper, the real issue is his race.” Having read Ding Gang’s article, it is baffling that Cody would write such a sentence considering that Ding Gang does discuss whether American’s think Obama is tough enough to answer the infamous 3 A.M. phone call. Ding Gang writes, “To borrow from the Hillary and Obama campaign’s advertisements, perhaps what may in the end decide people’s vote is the frame of mind, “Imagine its 3:00 A.M. at the White House and the red phone is answered; if the person answering is McCain, it would be more reassuring.”

It’s clear that Mr. Cody has no grasp of “The Obama Phenomenon” or the Chinese view in general. In any translation of a Chinese article that discusses skin color one is immediately struck by how the Chinese language uses the terms “black people”, “white people”, and skin color. The Chinese are not delicate about racial features, and as of yet haven’t taken on the politically correct language that many in the U.S. expect. Ding Gang’s article is no exception. He is blunt about the issue of race and gives a very straightforward argument on how Obama relates to American society and African Americans in general. However, can one truly say that the WASP driven culture, assimilation, and Obama’s relation to the African American community are settled issues? It likewise seems ridiculous to use Ding Gang’s article to paint him and the entire Chinese people as “fascinated” with skin color.

Mr. Cody uses a broad brush indeed. It’s quite clear by the third paragraph that he is using Ding Gang’s article to attack China on its treatment of Tibetans, Uighurs, and minorities in general. In a particularly snide remark, he states, “The editorial sought to explain that Obama's breakthrough should not be understood as a demonstration that race relations have crossed a threshold in the United States that China has yet to approach.” While it is true Ding Gang posited that one of the biggest factors in the primary was Obama’s skin color, Mr. Cody never really made an argument against that idea. Instead, he decided to use the painfully weak method of arguing against a foreign reporter by attacking him for the policies of a government in which he had no say, and have nothing to do with Ding Gangs article.

Perhaps more foul is Cody’s implication that Ding Gang is not a real person: “Ding Gang, a name frequently assigned to important analyses in a publication that plays the role of party bulletin board. Chinese journalists said they believe it is a pen name used by senior editors or other party propaganda officials conveying an official point of view.” In actuality, Ding Gang is the associate director of the International Department of The People’s Daily and “The Obama Phenomenon” appeared in its overseas edition. That Mr. Cody would make such an egregious error as calling the author’s existence into question is shocking, but as it appears he failed to do so much as read Ding Gang’s article it’s hard to imagine Mr. Cody thoroughly inquiring into fallacious hearsay regarding the Chinese writer.

In the West we tend to believe that we are privy to the most accurate press in the world; free of bias and factually accurate. But with China bashing inaccurate articles like, “In China, Fascination with Obama's Skin Color”, it is time we had a look at what newspapers and 24 hour news/entertainment channels are calling news. For an article that so distorts a Chinese author’s message (as well as claiming he isn’t real) to lash out against the Chinese government is reprehensible, especially since the original is not readily readable by the average Washington Post consumer. The blatant inability to have a coherent argument, accurately represent a foreign article, do basic fact checking, and leave out anti-Chinese sentiment makes Edward Cody and the Washington Post resemble a ridiculous screed. How ridiculous do the claims that China’s media is censored and useless appear when the Washington Post uses their freedom of speech to run a tabloid and call it news?

True Pride

“Personally, I have always thought of myself as trying to understand China and explain what the Chinese point of view might be.” Good article in Time about something that is important to understand. also here.

By Jiajia Liu

Just a few weeks ago, the west's view of china was dominated by thuggish torch guards, hypersensitive nationalists and a repressive government. But since the earthquake in Sichuan, the immense state-led rescue effort and the outpouring of charity from the Chinese people has taken center stage. Has the country really changed that much? Not really. The two phenomena on display — nationalism and compassion — are related facets of the vast, multidimensional nation that China is. When it comes to my homeland, I feel them both.

I left China in 1989, just after Tiananmen, when I was 7. My mother and I traveled to London to join my father, a Ph.D. student sponsored by the Chinese government. I grew up in London, and studied as an undergrad in the U.S. before going to Paris for a master's degree. My international education was a product of curiosity and restlessness. I am essentially a Westerner. Yet China has a special place in my identity — and in my heart.

When I first came to London, even the most pro-China overseas students denounced the Chinese government. I quickly swapped my faith in Chairman Mao for a conviction that the West would help the Chinese people advance to liberation and happiness. In school, I was taught to critically examine everything I was told. But I became perplexed by the behavior of the supposedly neutral media. No report of China was ever complete without a mention of Tiananmen; no Chinese interviewee ever had anything positive to say about his or her life. It seemed to me that Western media were exclusively highlighting the worst side of China.

My Western compatriots, normally so skeptical of the media, seemed to buy this depiction of China. Friends would tell me in low, excited tones that they were going to China. Would they be arrested? No, I would say: Chinese criticize the government all the time.

In the case of the protests against the Olympic torch relay, which were sparked by the Tibet crackdown, the angry response of ordinary Chinese was automatically presumed to be stoked by propaganda. The reality is that Chinese people are not a brainwashed bunch. While they may rely more heavily on domestic news sources, they do realize that the information is censored, and many who read English seek Western news. My Western compatriots, in contrast, trust solely in a market-driven Western press that caters to the popular mood and plays on public fears about a rising power culturally different from their own.

China is proud of its culture but also curious about other ones. Chinese people genuinely regard the Olympics as a wonderful way to introduce the world to their home. Opening your doors only to have them flung back in your face with misinformed and misguided moral disdain is deeply insulting. The Western press and public opinion are filled with condescension toward China, and the attitude that the West alone knows what is best for all peoples.

Why do I, a Western-educated Chinese, defend a country in which I don't live, and whose values are quite different from the ones I was raised with? To me, it is a question of simple mathematics. Twenty years ago, my parents could barely afford to buy me a $1 toy horse for my first Christmas present in London. Today, Chinese tourists flock to Louis Vuitton on the Champs Elysées. Life in China has gotten vastly better, and, wherever they are, Chinese can feel proud about being Chinese.

As for democracy, it remains to be seen what kind is suitable for China and when it can be introduced. Democracy is effective only when supported by the appropriate institutions and by cultural maturity. China is a vast country accustomed to imperial rule, where preserving overall harmony by suppressing individual freedoms is accepted. The current government is autocratic, but it is also adept at keeping the nation together by fast-tracking reforms. As an autocracy, moreover, Beijing can act with unparalleled efficiency for good, as shown in the massive rescue operation after the recent earthquake.

Perhaps my views qualify me as a nationalist. Personally, I have always thought of myself as trying to understand China and explain what the Chinese point of view might be. I have loved my international upbringing precisely because understanding — and appreciating — diverse cultural perspectives helps me overcome misconceptions, respect others and settle differences. The Sichuan earthquake, tragic as it was, has shown the world the compassionate face of Chinese nationalism. The human spirit underpins it and connects us all.

Jiajia Liu is a communications professional working for the WPP Group in London. She last visited China late last year

Who will maintain peaceful cross-Strait relations?

I usually find the Taiwan issue horribly boring, but this article translated by some of my colleagues in the US is rather interesting. also here.

An apology from Yan Xuetong

By Yan Xuetong, translated by Sean Ding and Heather Saul

[Yan Xuetong is the Director of International Studies at Tsinghua University]

Since 1999, when Lee Teng-hui put forward the “two nations” theory, I began to predict a possible military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. When Chen Shui-bian took office in 2000, I predicted that such a conflict would take place at some point before 2008. However, following this year’s election of the Taiwanese regional leadership and the failed UN referendum, relations are more stable than ever and there seems to be even greater prospects for peace. Thus, I would like to apologize to my readers for my false predictions. Secondly, I would like to engage in a mutual discussion concerning who is maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait.

Some people believe that the present peaceful relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland is because the KMT is in power and Ma Ying-jeou has accepted the “1992 consensus.” Yet since 1979 there has been no war in the Taiwan Strait. So, who has been upholding peaceful relations?

The foundations of peace in the Taiwan Strait

Peace in the Taiwan Strait began in 1979 when the PRC decided to adopt a policy of peaceful reunification with Taiwan; it did not begin when Ma Ying-jeou won the general election in 2008. Contrary to popular belief, the civil war between the KMT and the Communist Party did not end in 1949, but continued until the end of 1978 with both sides conducting military attacks on each other for nearly three decades.

Peace is the absence of large-scale military violence. On January 1, 1979 an official letter entitled, “The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress informs our Taiwan compatriots” declared: “The Chinese government has ordered that from today onwards, the bombardment of Kinmen and other islands will cease.” Indeed, since that day the Taiwan Strait has not witnessed any military clashes and has enjoyed 30 years of continuous peace.

The long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait is the direct result of the peaceful reunification policy adopted by the Mainland. After the KMT retreated to Taiwan, it never had the military strength to initiate a counterattack against the mainland. Likewise, the Korean War, which lasted from 1950-1953, showed that the U.S military could not overcome the People’s Liberation Army. The KMT was even less able to launch counterattacks on the mainland. Thus, the United States encouraged Taiwan to adopt a “two-China” policy or a “one China, one Taiwan” policy. In 1964, when China conducted nuclear tests (showing itself to be a nuclear power), the KMT government could only use the slogan “counterattack the mainland” as a piece of political propaganda, not as a realistic policy solution. In 1971, the PRC secured a legitimate seat in the United Nations, and in 1979 the United States normalized relations with the Mainland. This means that the desire by the US and Taiwan to initiate a attack disappeared and that as long as the mainland did not carry out military attacks against Taiwan, there was peace in the Taiwan Strait. This proves that the peaceful reunification policy that began in 1979 brought peace to the Taiwan Strait.

The underlying cause of long-term peace in the Taiwan Strait is based on the Mainland government’s principles concerning economic development. Since 1978 when the “reform and opening up” policy began, economic development has been the overriding mission of the Chinese government. Therefore, China’s policy priority has been to pursue relations as conducive to economic development. Reunification is just a political goal for the future. Beginning in the 1980’s, many Mainlanders believed that forceful reunification with Taiwan was not good for economic development on the Mainland. During the 1990’s, this understanding developed into the idea that military prevention of “Taiwan independence” was also not good for the Mainland’s economic development. In 1993, after Lee Teng-hui initiated the “Taiwan independence” policy, the “Taiwan Independence” forces blossomed. As these forces blossomed, the Mainland’s peaceful reunification policy was prevented from developing, leaving a more pressing issue: how to prevent “Taiwan independence.” As part of a military deterrence strategy against Taiwan independence, the Mainland practiced military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. However, this had no real effect on the Taiwan independence movement. Although many are suspicious that conducting military strikes could prevent “de jure independence,” the basic fact remains that as economic construction is the principle of the Mainland government, Beijing has never initiated military strikes in response to “Taiwan independence.”

New cross-Strait stability

The advent of 2008 has signified a new stable period of the Taiwan Strait. The Strait experienced both turbulence and stability in the past three decades: from 1979 to 1992, stability was achieved because the ruling parties on both sides opposed Taiwan independence, yet neither expected an immediate reunification. The 14 years between 1993 and 2007 was an unstable period, in which Taipei enthusiastically promoted independence, while the mainland could not tolerate such a policy. From 2008 onward, the Strait situation has again returned to stability, with no immediate danger of military conflict.

The current stability of the Taiwan Strait is based on two factors. First, Taipei’s authorities no longer use the “Taiwan independence” rhetoric in pursuit of national sovereignty, and second, the mainland would not react to a “Taiwan independence” challenge with force. As president Hu Jintao said on March 4, 2008 in his Taiwan policy speech, “We are always committed to our pledges to the Taiwan compatriots. We will never sway upon temporary fluctuations of the situation, or change upon a few individuals' deliberate disturbances”.

The presumption of the current stability of the Strait is that the two sides have agreed to shelve their controversies over the 1992 Consensus. Indeed, Beijing differs drastically from Taipei in terms of its interpretation of the 1992 Consensus. While the mainland insists that the essence of the Consensus is “one China”, Ma Ying-jeou’s administration believes that the two sides should agree to differ on the definition of such a concept. Ma suggests that while Taiwan and the mainland share a common Chinese culture, the two sides of the Strait should be two sovereign states. For instance, as recorded in the English edition of his inaugural address, Ma translates his original Chinese statement which suggests “both sides of the Strait belong to the same Chinese nation” into “In light of our common Chinese heritage”, reducing the externality of the “one China” concept to its minimum; also, after his electoral victory Ma introduced the policy of “mutual non-denial” for relations, indicating his unwillingness of being constrained by Beijing’s “one China” concept. In addition, Ma used both “Taiwan” and “Republic of China” as subjective in his inaugural speech, implying that “Republic of China” equals Taiwan. At the end of his speech, Ma even clearly defined Taiwan’s territory as including Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu.

Due to the two sides’ conflicting interpretations of the 1992 Consensus, shelving such disagreements has become an underlying presumption for peace. During the meetings between President Hu Jintao and the newly elected Taiwanese vice president Hsiao Wan-chang on April 7, 2008, Hsiao expressed his objections against the phrase “one China principle” printed on the official media report of his meetings with Hu. After this incident, Beijing’s official statements on Taiwan replaced the “one China principle” phrase with “1992 Consensus”. Such change represents the principle of “shelving controversies” in Beijing’s Taiwan policy, and indicates that mutual recognition of the 1992 Consensus is not sufficient for stability without shelving controversies over the Consensus.

Shelving controversies over the 1992 Consensus means that the both sides need to bring their disputes over sovereignty to an end. Since 1993 when Taiwan initiated its independence project, the nature of relations has transformed from power struggle to sovereignty dispute. As Ma Ying-jeou says in his inaugural address, “in resolving issues, what matters is not sovereignty but core values and way of life”. Ma also states that “Taiwan doesn't just want security and prosperity. It wants dignity. Only when Taiwan is no longer being isolated in the international arena can relations move forward with confidence”. Clearly, the presumption of relations pictured by Ma Ying-jeou resembles the separation of sovereignty between North and South Korea.

The future trend of peace

No military conflict will break out in the Taiwan Strait before 2016 if as long as both sides do not deny each other’s sovereignty. It is highly likely that Ma Ying-jeou will serve two terms. Beijing will not penalize Taiwan by military force for its attempts of expanding “international space”, as long as Ma keeps his commitment in “conducting dialogues based on the 1992 Consensus”. Under these circumstances, peace will be warranted. Ma Ying-jeou has proposed Taiwan’s participation in international organizations under the name “Chinese Taipei”: currently, Taiwan will participate in the Olympic Games as “Chinese Taipei”, and in the WTO as TPKM (Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu). Hence, it is possible that Taiwan will join most of the international organizations under the name “Chinese Taipei” in or before 2016. If this is the case, relations in 2016 will be significantly more amicable than the relations between the two Koreas, because there is no nuclear issue between the two sides.

If the two sides can reach a peace agreement, it is likely that the two sides will establish a mechanism for military exchange. President Hu Jintao states in his March 4^th speech that “the negotiation will be conducted on an equal footing with completely open topics -- there is nothing we can't talk about. We should seek to address important issues such as politics, economy, military, culture and foreign relations through negotiations, and plan for the future development of relations”. Ma Ying-jeou responded to Hu’s proposal in his May 20^th inaugural address by calling upon the two sides to “pursue reconciliation and truce in both and international arenas”. Ma also suggests: “We should help and respect each other in international organizations and activities”. If the two sides construct a mutual assistance relationship in international organizations, there will be no obstacles for military exchange. Once the two sides conduct military exchange, the prospect of peace will be much more optimistic than peace on the Korean peninsula, where a military exchange mechanism is absent.

If the two sides maintain political dialogue, the development of the U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will not trigger tension in the Strait. The military foundations of Taiwan independence rely on America’s military protection. Since a strengthened U.S.-Taiwan military cooperation will inevitably encourage the pro-independence forces on the Island, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have always been a destabilizing factor. relations should remain peaceful, and Beijing will not deter Taipei for its arms deals with Washington, if the two sides take advantage of the current harmony and establish a military exchange mechanism that is capable of neutralizing the negative effects caused by U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. For instance, the U.S. government informed China on March 25^th that it mistakenly shipped four fuses for nuclear missiles to Taiwan in 2006. Although Beijing demanded Washington to conduct a thorough investigation, such an incident did not impact the development of relations. The fact that Ma Ying-jeou’s government will inevitably purchase arms from the U.S. will become a serious trouble for China; however, Beijing’s policymakers do not necessarily have to pressure their counterparts across the Strait in order to resolve the problem.

The stable trend of peace beginning from 2008 will undoubtedly promote peace and development in the Taiwan Strait, although no one can foresee if such a trend will effectively prevent Taiwan independence and further reunification. During the past 30 years, the Taiwan Strait has remained peaceful; reunification has yet to be achieved; and Taiwan independence forces have been strengthened. I hope that my forecasts on relations in the coming 8 years will not be proven wrong, as were the false predictions about a military conflict in the Strait that I previously made.

Morality check: the “running teacher” and public values in China

I really like this article. And I don't usually say that about things I like. Really! here.

By Jennifer Haskell

The May 12 Wenchuan earthquake acted as a mirror in which China saw a reflection of itself. And for the most part, the Chinese people liked what they saw. Sure, corruption is rampant among local governments, as embodied by collapsed school buildings, but the central government seems to genuinely care about the common people, as represented by the tears of Premier Wen Jiabao. The Chinese people also saw in their fellow citizens a willingness to selflessly help others in times of distress, a quality that was not immediately evident before the disaster. In the weeks following the earthquake, people found hope in the generosity of the millions who donated, in the bravery of the volunteers and soldiers, and in the stories of heroism, of parents and teachers who sacrificed their lives.

Ten days later a story of a different nature appeared online. Fan Meizhong, a high school teacher in Dujiangyan, a hard-hit town, wrote a post on the widely popular Tianya forum detailing his experience during the earthquake. When the disaster hit, he yelled, “Earthquake!” and then immediately ran from the room, giving his students no instructions. While his school was not damaged and no students were harmed, his students had remained in their classroom; not a single one had followed their teacher out of the room. He justified his actions by saying that there is no specific legal regulation that gives instructions on how a teacher should behave in an emergency, and those who expect him to act heroically are imposing their own expectations and sense of morality. According to Fan, his belief in liberalism allows him to be selfish and value his own life first; he would only be willing to sacrifice himself in order to save his daughter and would even leave his mother to die, a direct assault on the importance Chinese tradition puts on filial piety.

Obviously, his post caused an uproar among Chinese netizens, leading to his nickname “Running Fan” or the “Running Teacher” (Fan Paopao), and even to his firing. His actions were criticized as disgraceful, and people wondered why on earth he would publicize his cowardice. Yet, Fan Meizhong's story has also elicited a debate about morality in China, and provided an opportunity to re-examine the country's collective moral values.

Like other targets of netizens' outrage before him (see: Grace Wang), criticism of Teacher Fan quickly crossed the line of common courtesy. As Si Wenhan, the pen name for a member of the Standing Committee of Dadukou District People’s Congress in Chongqing, points out, no officials at any level of government, no matter how responsible they may have been for the collapse of “tofu dregs” school buildings, have been on the receiving end of such harsh censure. This all came to a head on June 7, when Fan Meizhong and Guo Songmin, one of his critics, met in a head to head debate on Phoenix TV, during which Mr. Guo, who seemed to see himself as the upholder of morality, had a string of harsh words for Teacher Fan. He called him “shameless,” “a beast,” and “a half-breed,” and showed no concern for common courtesies of debate, often interrupting his opponent. Because of Mr. Guo's behavior, Chinese netizens have named him “Guo the Clown” (Guo Tiaotiao), indicating that he had made a fool of himself. Since the TV broadcast, they have also generally been more sympathetic to Fan Meizhong than the moralizing Guo Songmin.

As numerous commentators have pointed out, one reason we should all hesitate before lashing out at Teacher Fan is that, in truth, we are all like him. As Cao Lin pointed out in the Oriental Morning Post, Fan Meizhong had the courage to tell his story, and “Who dares assert that they do not have a part of Fan Meizhong in them? Who dares say that in the far reaches of their minds, they have never had a flash of thinking like Fan Meizhong's?” Chinese netizens and “morality police” have taken their own fantastical, idealistic notions of morality and tried to enforce them among the general population. They forget that they, like Teacher Fan, are human and have the same human flaws of hypocrisy, conceit and insecurity, all of which came out during Guo Songmin's tirade.

Yet, the controversy surrounding Fan Meizhong has provoked more than nasty insults. His story and especially his rationale for running have stimulated a debate about what common moral values we can expect others to hold. Teacher Fan used aspects of liberalism and his right to pursue the safety of his own life over saving others as justification for his actions. Shao Jian, a teacher in the Department of Chinese Language and Literature at Nanjing Xiaozhuang College, however, believes that his understanding of liberalism is flawed. While liberalism grants people certain rights, it also requires certain duties, and in leaving his students behind, Fan Meizhong abandoned his duty as a teacher.

Additionally, while the liberal market system and liberal governmental systems often presume that all individuals will act selfishly in their own interests, only extreme believers in liberalism – like Ayn Rand – actually view selfishness and lack of charity towards others as praiseworthy. Heroism and even cooperation cannot be counted on but that does not mean they are not virtuous, as a belief in liberalism is most certainly not equivalent to valuing selfishness. Because there were no regulations instructing otherwise, it can be assumed that most liberals would see Teacher Fan's behavior as lawful but definitely not admirable. Had the same situation occurred in the United States, Americans would probably harbor similar feelings of disgust towards the “Running Teacher,” (Americans craved stories of heroism after 9/11 just as Chinese did after the earthquake) though there would also likely be more questioning of why the school or education system as a whole had no regulations governing teacher and student behavior during emergencies.

Teacher Fan's run – and especially his public account of his actions – certainly challenged the status quo of traditional thinking about morality in China. But where does that leave us in constructing new ideas about public values? Li Zhongqin, a writer and former member of the Shandong Writers Association, argues that the Chinese need to stop advocating ideas of morality that correspond more closely with the morality of a sage* or the morality of a hero. It is unrealistic to expect people to put others' interests before or even on the same level as their own. The morality police who self-righteously expect others like Teacher Fan to sacrifice their own interests and even possibly their lives for others are also acting selfishly and unfairly by putting a higher value on the lives of some over others (as Li points out, Fan Meizhong's students were all in their second year of high school – almost adults – not young children). While attempting to uphold such unattainable standards of morality, the idea of citizen's morality has still not truly emerged in China; such an idea makes use of the liberal assumption of innate selfishness, yet as Li explains, from this assumption can come win-win outcomes and mutual benefit. Such a moral system would still give praise and credit to those who act heroically but would not depend upon each person to do so.

Is China ready to adopt such a citizen's idea of morality? That is not entirely clear. By invoking the word “citizen,” in addition to requiring people in China to respect individual choices of others, Li Zhongqin also implies that people should also begin to engage and question the government, as per the duty of a citizen. Instead of dwelling on Fan Meizhong's personal failings, they should worry more about systemic problems, such as the collapse of schools and the lack of regulations regarding classroom behavior in the case of disaster. The firing of Teacher Fan indicates that China might have a long way to go, but at least the conversation has begun.

*In Chinese history, the sage is looked up to as someone who embodies the highest level of morality, with Confucius being the most famous and revered. In Li Zhongqin's article, the morality of a sage is higher than that of a hero, as the sage puts others' interests first, while a hero puts others on an equal plane.